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Abstract:  
Disabled individuals under 65 years old account for 15% of Medicaid 
recipients but half of all Medicaid spending. Despite their large cost, few 
studies have investigated the effects of Medicaid expansions for disabled 
individuals on insurance coverage and crowd-out of private insurance. Using 
an eligibility expansion that allowed states to provide Medicaid to disabled 
individuals with incomes less than 100% of the federal poverty level, I 
address these issues. Crowd-out estimates range from 49% using an ordinary 
least squares procedure to 100% using two-stage least- squares analysis. 
This potentially large degree of crowd-out could have fiscal implications for 
the Affordable Care Act which has greatly expanded Medicaid eligibility in 
2014.  
Keywords: Medicaid Expansions, Health Insurance, Crowd-out, Disability. 
(JEL: H4, I1) 
1. Introduction 
A major feature of the healthcare reform enacted in the United 
States under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is 
the expansion of state Medicaid programs to provide health coverage 
to all individuals under the age of 65 who have incomes less than 
138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). As of November 2014, only 
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27 states have expanded their Medicaid programs, but estimates 
suggest that more than 25 million uninsured Americans would gain 
coverage if all states were to adopt the legislation (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012, 2014, Holahan et al., 2012).1 A widespread concern 
of expanding Medicaid is that newly eligible individuals who have 
private insurance will choose to drop their private plans and take-up 
Medicaid coverage instead due to Medicaid’s low cost – a phenomenon 
known as “crowd-out.” The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model (HIPSM) assumes a crowd-out rate of 22% to predict 
changes in insurance coverage from the PPACA (Buettgens, 2011). 
This rate is primarily based on crowd-out estimates from Medicaid 
expansions for children and their parents. Children and parents are 
expected to make up a small portion of the new Medicaid eligibles, 
however, under the PPACA. If crowd-out for other populations is larger 
than 22%, then the predictions from HIPSM will overestimate the 
reduction in the uninsured population from the PPACA Medicaid 
expansions (Holahan et al., 2012). 
One subset of the population that stands to gain from the PPACA 
Medicaid expansions is disabled individuals under 65. Medicaid has 
typically only covered disabled individuals with very low income levels, 
but the PPACA will allow those with higher levels of income to qualify. 
The average income eligibility limit for the disabled was 87% of the 
federal poverty level (FPL) in 2008. More than 3.5 million work 
disabled Americans had incomes between 87 and 138% FPL in 2011 
(Author’s calculations using the March CPS 2012) and would be eligible 
for coverage if all states adopt the PPACA Medicaid expansions. 
The disabled under 65 are the most expensive coverage group 
under Medicaid and accounted for 43% ($160 billion) of total Medicaid 
payments even though they made up only 15% of recipients in 2009 
(Kaiser Family Foundation: statehealthfacts.org). Despite their 
expense, effects from Medicaid eligibility expansions for the disabled 
population are not well understood. This paper examines a Medicaid 
eligibility expansion that allowed states the option to offer Medicaid to 
their disabled residents who had monthly incomes up to 100% of the 
FPL. Given their different health needs and cost of care, the disabled 
                                                          
1 Initially, the PPACA Medicaid expansions were required of all states, but became optional under 
a June 2012 Supreme Court ruling. 
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population may experience a different rate of crowd-out than children 
and parents. 
In this paper, I focus on the effects of Medicaid eligibility on health 
coverage for working-age individuals who report having a work 
disability. As with earlier Medicaid expansion research, OLS estimates 
are subject to omitted variables bias and measurement error. To 
account for these issues, I use the simulated instrument originally 
described in Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) to measure only 
the legislative effect of changes in Medicaid eligibility. Using two large, 
nationally representative datasets and a two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) analysis, I find the rate of crowd-out to be about 100%. This 
rate is much larger than what has been found in Medicaid expansions 
for parents and children. The point estimate of crowd-out is 
statistically significant at the 5% level and is robust to several 
alternative samples. The confidence interval for this estimate, 
however, is broad and so we interpret it with caution. 
2. Literature Review 
Simon and Gruber (2008) provide an excellent review of the 
crowd-out literature which I will briefly summarize below. The effect of 
Medicaid eligibility expansions on participation and crowd-out has been 
primarily investigated through expansions for children and their 
families. The flagship paper in this field is Cutler and Gruber (1996) 
who used a 2SLS approach to investigate the effect of Medicaid 
eligibility expansions for children and pregnant women on health 
insurance coverage with the simulated eligibility instrument of Currie 
and Gruber (1996a, 1996b). Cutler and Gruber (1996) found a large 
and statistically significant degree of crowd-out, but many follow-up 
papers found smaller amounts. Across the entire literature, crowd-out 
measures have varied widely from as small as 0% to as large as 60% 
for children and families.2 
                                                          
2 See Aizer and Grogger (2003), Blumberg et al. (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Cutler 
and Gruber (1996), Dubay and Kenney (1996) and (1997), Gruber and Simon (2008), Ham and 
Shore-Sheppard (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), Hudson et al. (2005), LoSasso and 
Buchmueller (2004), Shore-Sheppard (2008), Thorpe and Florence (1998), and Yazici and 
Kaestner (2000) for these estimates. 
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Subsequent papers explain the smaller size of crowd-out through 
several key criticisms of the Cutler and Gruber (1996) empirical 
strategy, one of which is that they used the annual from the March 
Current Population Survey (CPS) rather than monthly data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In this paper, I 
analyze data from both the CPS and the SIPP and find similar results 
for the disabled population. Another critique in this literature is that 
crowd-out estimates can be sensitive to the treatment of individuals 
reporting private and Medicaid coverage simultaneously (Gruber and 
Simon, 2008). Populations with overlapping coverage can be 
interpreted in multiple ways, but it has become standard practice to 
assume that this group is transitioning from private insurance to 
Medicaid. In my analysis, I find little difference in crowd-out measures 
accounting and not accounting for the overlap population. 
In addition to crowd-out for children and parents, a recent paper 
finds evidence of crowd- out among the childless adult population. 
Garthwaite et al. (2013) finds that private health insurance coverage 
sharply increased for childless adults in conjunction with an increase in 
their labor supply after their disenrollment from TennCare, an 
extension of Tennessee’s Medicaid program. This implies that childless 
adults pursued health coverage through an employer after losing 
public coverage and this suggests evidence of crowd-out.3 The results 
from Garthwaite et al. (2013) are informative regarding the PPACA 
Medicaid expansions since the majority of those who will become 
eligible are childless adults. Disabled individuals, though they make up 
a smaller portion of the PPACA eligible population, will gain some 
eligibility through the expansions. Given their expensive health care 
needs, the cost of the PPACA expansions for disabled individuals may 
be economically meaningful despite their small population size. 
3. Medicaid, Eligibility Expansions, and Eligibility 
Pathways for the Disabled 
In fiscal year 2010, Medicaid spent $389 billion to provide health 
coverage to roughly 60 million low-income Americans (Kaiser Family 
                                                          
3 It should be noted, however, that the results for the TennCare disenrollment are unique in the 
literature and several other papers (in particular those on the Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment) do not find big changes in employment due to health insurance (Baicker et al., 
2013). 
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Foundation: statehealthfacts.org). The program is means-tested and 
jointly funded by both federal and state governments with the federal 
government covering at least half of all Medicaid spending for each 
state (Kaiser Family Foundation: statehealthfacts.org).4 States are 
responsible for the administration of their own Medicaid programs, but 
are required to meet minimum federal requirements in terms of 
services covered and eligibility standards. While Medicaid also covers 
groups such as children, pregnant women, parents, and the elderly, I 
will focus on the coverage of disabled individuals. 
There are several pathways through which disabled people can 
become eligible for Medicaid coverage. I impute eligibility based only 
on three pathways where an individual qualifies for coverage by having 
low income and a disability: the Supplemental Security Income 
Program (SSI), the State Supplemental Payment Program (SSP), and 
poverty-related coverage. SSI and SSP are programs that provide cash 
assistance to disabled individuals and typically come with Medicaid 
coverage automatically.5 These pathways are accounted for when 
imputing eligibility, but there were few changes in the eligibility 
standards for these programs from 1995 to 2007 and they do not 
provide much variation. 
Of the three main eligibility pathways used to impute eligibility in 
this paper, poverty- related Medicaid has experienced the greatest 
changes recently and generates most of the variation that identifies 
the econometric model. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 
(OBRA86) authorized this pathway and gave states the option to 
increase the Medicaid income eligibility level for the disabled up to 
100% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Prior to the OBRA86, disabled 
individuals mainly had to qualify under SSI which required an income 
level below 74% FPL of income (Social Security Administration, 2012). 
While some states opted into the 100% FPL pathway soon after the 
                                                          
4 The federal reimbursement rate of Medicaid expenses in each state is called the Federal 
Medical Assistance percent (FMAP). FMAPs range from 50% to 74.73%. States with lower 
incomes per capita relative to the US income per capita receive higher reimbursement rates from 
the federal government (Baumrucker, 2010). 
 
5 This is not always the case. 209(b) states are allowed to have stricter standards for eligibility 
than SSI standards. Some states also require a separate application for Medicaid in addition to 
their SSI application. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
6 
 
passage of the OBRA86, after this initial round of adoptions, eight 
states increased the income eligibility level for the disabled to 100% of 
the FPL between 1998 to 2003 period (Bruen et al., 2003). I take 
advantage of the variation in timing of adopting the poverty-related 
coverage as well as the magnitude of the income eligibility level during 
this later enactment period to identify changes in Medicaid take-up and 
crowd-out. 
There are other pathways for disabled Medicaid eligibility that are 
not used for eligibility imputation in this analysis. One such pathway is 
a Medically Needy program through which some states provide 
Medicaid to disabled individuals with exorbitant medical fees. Another 
pathway is a state buy-in program that allows disabled individuals with 
incomes above the eligibility levels to purchase Medicaid as an 
insurance plan. Buy-in plans required that purchasers be employed 
and pay a premium for coverage which is unlike the three pathways 
used to impute eligibility. To ensure that buy-in programs are not what 
drives my results, I run an additional model that adds buy-in program 
indicator variables to the main model.6 
The final pathway excluded from eligibility imputation is cost 
sharing options with Medicare or dual-eligibles (see the appendix for 
more information on these individuals). The benefits package for dual-
eligibles is not as generous as the package received under other 
pathways of eligibility. As a result I treat individuals who qualify for 
Medicaid coverage under cost sharing as having an alternative form of 
Medicaid and Medicaid participation results in this paper do not 
consider Medicare cost sharing recipients.7 See the Appendix for 
further information on Medicaid eligibility pathways for the disabled. 
 
                                                          
6 With the addition of controls for the presence of a Buy-in program the estimates of take-up for 
Medicaid and private insurance is 0.404 (0.140) and -0.445 (0.148) respectively. The coefficients 
on the Buy-in indicator variable in these models are -0.002 (0.011) and 0.009 (0.015) suggesting 
that the presence of a buy-in program had little effect on the Medicaid and Private insurance 
take-up rates.  State clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
7 Including cost sharing individuals in the analysis produces Medicaid and private take-up 
estimates of 0.339 (0.180) and -0.529 (0.213) respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
These estimates suggest a crowd-out point estimate of 156% which is even larger than the 
primary specification. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
Following the approach from Cutler and Gruber (1996) for 
measuring the impact of Medicaid expansions on take-up and crowd-
out, we estimate the following equation 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡𝛽2 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡    (1) 
where i, s, and, t index the individual, state, and year respectively. 
The dependent variable, Coverageist, is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if an individual has health coverage of a certain type 
(Medicaid, Private, or Uninsured), and equals zero otherwise. The key 
variable of interest, Eligibleist, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
person is eligible for Medicaid coverage and zero otherwise. Xist is a 
vector of demographic characteristics including age, education, sex, 
race, family size, number of children in the household, and marital 
status. The variables 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state and year fixed effects 
respectively and the final term is a random error. 
In order to impute eligibility, we must first determine the Medicaid 
standards specific to each state and year. There is no central database 
for state Medicaid eligibility policies. Following Brown et al. (2007) and 
Coe (2005), I compiled Medicaid eligibility information from numerous 
sources.8 With this information, I constructed the income eligibility 
limits for disabled Medicaid applicants in each state for all years 
between 1996 and 2007. The income eligibility limit is the highest level 
of income (as a percent of the federal poverty level) that a disabled 
individual can have and still qualify for Medicaid coverage. This is 
constructed by taking the most generous of the SSI/209(b), poverty-
related, and SSP pathways available to the disabled in a given state 
and year. The 1996 and 2007 income eligibility limits by state are 
shown in Table 1. 
Using the eligibility standards for each state, we can impute 
eligibility for an individual. To do this we use the 1996, 2001, and 
2004 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
                                                          
8 The specific sources used to construct the upper income threshold of Medicaid eligibility rules 
for the aged and disabled were Brown et al. (2005) , Bruen, Wiener, and Thomas (2003), Bruen, 
Wiener, Kim, and Miazad (1999), Coe (2005) , Congressional Research Service (1993), De Nardi et 
al. (2011), Horvath (1997), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2010), Kassner 
(2000), Mississippi Division of Medicaid (1991-2008), Social Security Administration (1991-2008), 
Stone (2002, 2011), and state Medicaid websites. 
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(SIPP). Each SIPP panel has 12 waves (interviews) except the 2001 
panel which only has nine and surveys at least 40,000 households. 
Every four months, the SIPP asks respondents a set of core questions 
including information on basic demographics (age, sex, race, etc.), 
income, and participation in programs such as Medicaid or 
Supplemental Security Income. Respondents are interviewed every 
four months, but are asked to report information for each of the four 
months in the reference period. Thus the core data in the SIPP are at 
the person-month level.9 I limit the analysis, however, to only 
observations reported in the fourth reference month due to the 
potential for transitions in health coverage or family status only being 
reported between interviews (“seams”) rather than between months. 
This is consistent with other work on Medicaid using the SIPP 
(Hamersma and Kim, 2013; Gruber and Simon, 2008). 
 
4.1 Definition of Disability 
The official definition of disability for Medicaid eligibility is the 
same definition the Social Security Administration (SSA) employs for 
SSI qualification (Families USA, 2001). This definition also applies for 
the higher income individuals qualifying under the OBRA86 Medicaid 
expansions. Per SSA guidelines an adult is disabled if she has a 
“medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents 
“substantial gainful activity” and is expected to “result in death” or has 
“lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 
than 12 months” (Social Security Administration, 2012). This is a 
broad definition that relies heavily on a doctor’s subjective opinion as 
to the severity of the condition rather than a decisive cutoff 
measurement. Household surveys do not contain a measure of this 
exact definition and more often contain information regarding different 
difficulties or specific conditions of an individual. 
                                                          
9 Given that the SIPP is a panel data set it is possible that a respondent could have up to 12 
interviews in any given pattern. Standard errors throughout the main analysis are clustered at 
the state level since the Medicaid expansions vary by the state. When we cluster at the individual 
level, however, the standard errors are similar. The individually clustered standard errors for 
Medicaid, Private, and Overlap take-up estimates are (0.147), (0.160), and (0.063) respectively. 
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The closest measure of disability that is available in both the SIPP 
and March CPS are the work disability variables in those surveys.10 
These certainly have their limitations in that they are self-reported in 
both surveys and individuals may not have a clear conception of 
disability or impairment status when answering the question (US 
Census Bureau, 2012). Despite these limitations, however, there is 
some evidence to document that disability trends in work disability 
status may be related to disability trends measured by impairment 
status. This suggests that though the work disability measure is not 
perfect it is correlated with other conceptualizations of disability 
(Burkhauser et al., 2003). 
Within the SIPP, 85% of individuals aged 20-64 who report having 
a work disability have a total personal income less than the average 
per capita income in the United States and 65% of these individuals 
have incomes less than half the average per capita income. Since 
“substantial gainful activity” for disability is commonly measured in 
terms of an income cutoff, the work disabled sample appears to be 
identifying a population that may have difficulties performing 
substantial gainful activity. Measurement error for this disability 
definition also does not appear to be related to the Medicaid legislative 
changes as individuals were not more likely to report a work disability 
after the eligibility expansions went into effect (results not shown). 
4.2 Imputing Eligibility 
A person is eligible for Medicaid coverage if her personal income 
minus income disregarded from eligibility determination is less than 
the threshold in a person’s state of residence. Eligibility is defined as a 
person’s own eligibility.11 Income considered during eligibility 
                                                          
10 The specific question from the SIPP survey is “Does ... have a physical, mental, or other health 
condition that limits the kind or amount of work ... can do at a job or business?” (United States 
Census Bureau, 1996). The specific question in the March CPS is “(Do you/Does anyone in this 
household) have a health problem or disability which prevents (you/them) from working or 
which limits the kind or amount of work (you/they) can do?” (United States Census Bureau, 
2012). 
 
11 Gruber and Simon (2008) demonstrated the sensitivity of results to family spillover effects 
where a child could benefit from a sibling being Medicaid eligible. Since the sample I am 
considering includes working-age disabled adults rather than children and one individual’s 
Medicaid status does not influence another’s, I do not use family income to determine eligibility. 
I do, however, run an analysis where I include spousal income in eligibility determination. In this 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
10 
 
determination is referred to as countable income and is constructed by 
subtracting disregards – any income that is not considered when 
determining Medicaid eligibility – from a person’s total income. There 
are several types of income that are disregarded from Medicaid 
eligibility determination. By federal law, every individual receives an 
automatic monthly disregard of $20. Some states (such as California 
and Connecticut) choose to disregard larger amounts. Also, income 
received through the Supplemental Security Income program does not 
count towards Medicaid eligibility.12 In addition to SSI payments, a 
portion of earned income is disregarded.13 Subtracting the total 
amount of disregards from an individual’s total income produces 
countable income for Medicaid eligibility.14 
In reality, Medicaid eligibility is determined not only using a 
person’s income level but also her financial assets. The SIPP, however, 
only contains asset information once a year rather than a monthly 
basis like income information. Due to this restriction, my main analysis 
does not consider assets when determining eligibility.15 This is a 
                                                          
analysis, a couple is eligible for Medicaid if at least one of them reports having a work disability 
and the total income from both individuals is less than the Federal Poverty Level for a family of 
size 2. The crowd-out measurements from the spousal analysis are not substantially different 
from the individual eligibility analysis. Spousal analysis Medicaid, Private, and Overlap take-up 
rates are 0.445 (0.187), -0.532 (0.152), and 0.031 (0.094) respectively.  State clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
12 In the majority of states, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income is automatically eligible 
for Medicaid coverage. In 2008, however, there were eleven states that used the 209(b) option 
which allowed state Medicaid offices to impose stricter standards on Medicaid eligibility than 
federal SSI requirements. 
 
13 $65 plus ½ *(total income earned – 65) per month of earned income is not counted towards 
eligibility determination. 
 
14 Given that the income information in the SIPP is self-reported, there is likely measurement 
error in the imputed eligibility variable. Hamersma and Kim (2013) proposed an estimation 
strategy in which we use the actual Medicaid income threshold (as a percent of the FPL) rather 
than imputed eligibility. Following this strategy, I find the effect on Medicaid, Private, and 
Overlap insurance to be 0.133 (0.050), -0.150 (0.080), and 0.043 (0.019) respectively. State 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The Hamersma and Kim strategy take-up rates 
suggest similar point estimates as my primary analysis, but only crowd-out estimates accounting 
for the overlap group are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
15 In an annual analysis, using asset information to determine eligibility does not greatly influence 
results. 
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restriction that most papers on crowd-out face and assets usually have 
not been used in the imputation of eligibility. The SIPP does not 
uniquely identify every state and instead groups some states together 
in some of its panels. As a result, I drop five states from the analysis 
(Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming). 
Given the research question, I limit the sample to respondents 
within the SIPP who report a work-limiting disability. I eliminate 
everyone under the age of 20 (who could potentially qualify for 
Medicaid under eligibility rules for children which are more generous) 
and the elderly (those over the age of 65, most of who automatically 
qualify for Medicare). Across all three panels of the SIPP considered in 
this study, 41,554 individuals between 20 and 64 years of age 
reported having a work-limiting disability. In 1996, the first year of our 
sample, 819 individuals reported a work-limiting disability and had 
incomes between 74 and 100% of the FPL and was approximately 
1.5% of the working age population in that year. Of these 819 
individuals, 37% resided in a state that would eventually expand 
Medicaid to the disabled using the OBRA86 option. 
Summary statistics for the ineligible and the eligible sample in the 
SIPP are presented in Table 2. The observed differences between the 
two samples are consistent with previous research. The eligible sample 
contains a higher percentage of women, blacks, and those individuals 
with lower levels of education which is not surprising as these 
characteristics are associated with lower income levels and 
disadvantaged populations. As expected, there is a dramatic difference 
in income between the ineligible and the eligible samples since this is a 
key determinant of eligibility. The eligible group also has higher rates 
of Medicaid coverage and uninsurance and are less likely to have 
private plans or be on Medicare. 
Since the OBRA86 expansions raised Medicaid eligibility levels 
above SSI qualification levels, the majority of Medicaid take-up and 
crowd-out will be driven by non-SSI recipients. Disabled individuals 
through SSI, however, may be inherently different from non-SSI 
individuals perhaps due to various health conditions or income levels. 
Non-SSI Medicaid recipients, however, constitute a large share of the 
disabled Medicaid population. Nearly 40% of disabled Medicaid 
enrollment was for non-SSI beneficiaries in 2010 
(statehealthfacts.org). This is consistent with summary statistics in the 
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SIPP which had 42% of work disabled individuals possessing Medicaid 
coverage but not receiving income from SSI. Thus, though the 
majority of disabled Medicaid beneficiaries originate from the SSI 
program, there is also a fairly large number of non-SSI Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Given the size of their population and since the majority 
of future Medicaid income-eligibility expansions will apply to them, 
take-up and crowd-out rates for the non-SSI disabled are relevant 
even if they are inherently different from SSI recipients. 
OLS estimates of equation (1) are potentially subject to an omitted 
variables bias. Characteristics that determine eligibility for Medicaid 
are likely linked with demand for health insurance. Though many of 
these characteristics are accounted for in the demographic controls 
vector, there may be omitted variables influencing insurance take-up. 
Reverse causality may also be a concern within the model. Given that I 
am examining a sample of individuals reporting a disability, it is likely 
that many of them face difficulties working. Since a large share of 
private health coverage is provided through employers, a large portion 
of my sample may be less likely to have private coverage due to an 
inability to work which also results in lower levels of income. Thus, 
there is a potential for a negative spurious relationship between 
Medicaid eligibility and health coverage. Since Medicaid eligibility is 
also imputed using reported income information from the SIPP, 
measurement error is likely present in the model as well. 
To account for the omitted variables bias, measurement error, and 
reverse causality concerns, I follow Currie and Gruber (1996a and 
1996b) and construct a simulated instrument for eligibility. Since my 
sample size is small and not computationally overwhelming, I use the 
entire sample of disabled respondents from each year to simulate the 
instrument rather than select a smaller random sample as has been 
done in previous work. Using this national population, the simulated 
instrument is constructed as the percent of people that would be 
eligible for Medicaid coverage under each state’s individual eligibility 
rules for each year. When constructing these shares, I exclude 
respondents from the state whose laws are being used to simulate 
eligibility (Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005). These percents are then 
matched by state and year (based on the eligibility rules that 
constructed them) to respondents in the sample. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
13 
 
By constructing the simulated instrument, we are effectively 
producing a measure of Medicaid generosity by state and year that is 
not dependent upon the characteristics of the population within a 
given state. Instead, the variation in eligibility across state and time 
reflects the legislative changes in eligibility rules. Thus, the instrument 
depends on changes in state legislation concerning eligibility being 
exogenous. Essentially, we want it to be the case that OBRA86 
adopting states did not experience different trends in coverage rates 
compared to non- adopting states prior to the expansions. In Table 3, 
using data from the March CPS, I test the difference between pre-
trends and post-trends for adopting and non-adopting states. I use 
data from the CPS rather than the SIPP because it allows us to observe 
a longer period prior to the start of expansions.  The data is collapsed 
to construct the rate of coverage for the four forms of insurance by 
state and year. These rates are then regressed on state and year fixed 
effects and two variables that measure the pre- and post-adoption 
trends for states. The pre-adoption trend variable is a negative integer 
value that indicates the number of years until an expanding state’s 
adoption or zero for non-adopting states and years after the 
expansion. The post-adoption trend variable is a positive integer value 
that indicates the number of years after an expanding state’s adoption 
or zero for non-adopting states and years prior to the expansion. 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the pre-treatment 
analysis. There is no statistically significant difference in the pre-
adoption trends of coverage rates between adopting and non-adopting 
states for any of the insurance types and the coefficients are all near 
zero. This implies that states experienced little difference in coverage 
rate trends leading up to the expansions. The post-adoption trends for 
Medicaid and private coverage, however, are statistically significantly 
different between adopting and non-adopting states (see Columns 1 
and 2 in Table 3). Adopting states experienced an increase in their 
Medicaid coverage rates and a decrease in their private insurance 
rates relative to non-adopting states after the eligibility expansions 
went into effect.  The post-adoption coverage trends for Medicare and 
uninsurance are not statistically significantly different between the two 
types of states. These results are indicative of crowd-out though the 
magnitudes of the coefficients in this analysis do not suggest that 
crowd-out was complete. Overall, the results contained in Table 3 
indicate that pre-adoption coverage rate trends were similar for 
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adopting and non-adopting states and support the validity of the 
instrument, but by no means are a sufficient condition for no 
endogeneity. 
5. Results 
5.1 Tabular Results 
Following earlier literature, we first construct difference-in-
difference measures of crowd-out using a tabular approach. The top 
section of Table 4 contains the changes in health insurance coverage 
from 1996 (the beginning of our sample) to 2007 (the end of our 
sample) across four income groups using the work disability sample of 
the SIPP. In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of our crowd-out 
results to individuals who report possessing both private and Medicaid 
insurance coverage at the same time, we define three forms of health 
coverage: Medicaid only, private only, and overlapping coverage 
(Gruber and Simon, 2008).16 In addition to changes in health 
coverage, Table 4 also reports changes in imputed eligibility for each 
income group. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at 
the state level. 
Given that the OBRA86 expansions effectively raised the income 
thresholds for Medicaid eligibility from 74 to 100% of the FPL, we 
expect individuals with countable incomes within this range to be the 
most affected by the expansion. Table 4 suggests that this is the case. 
The lower section of Table 4 reports difference-in-difference estimates 
of eligibility and health coverage from the 74-100% FPL income group 
relative to three other income categories (less than 74% FPL, between 
100-150% FPL, and greater than 150% FPL). Table 4 also compares 
the 74-100% FPL group to all three of these other groups combined. 
Imputed Medicaid eligibility for the 74 to 100% FPL group increased by 
about 20 percentage points relative to every other income group from 
1996 to 2007. The rate of eligibility remained virtually unchanged for 
the other income groups across the time period. Coverage by Medicaid 
displays a similar pattern as eligibility. Relative to the other income 
                                                          
16 Coverage definitions for the tabulation results only take into account various forms of private 
and Medicaid coverage. Individuals may have alternative forms of coverage (such as military 
insurance or Medicare), but these are not accounted for in the coverage definitions for this 
analysis. These alternative forms are considered in a later robustness analysis. 
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groups, Medicaid coverage increased between 9.0 to 12.4 percentage 
points for the 74-100% FPL income group and 10.4 percentage points 
relative to all other income groups combined. All income groups 
experienced a reduction in private coverage over the time period, but 
the largest decrease was for the 74 to 100% FPL group. The change in 
overlap coverage is similar across all income groups. 
Table 5 presents crowd-out measures resulting from the tabular 
results in Table 4. Following Gruber and Simon (2008), we construct 
one measure of crowd-out that ignores the overlap group and another 
measure of crowd-out which interprets the overlap coverage as a 
transition from private to Medicaid coverage. Table 5 presents crowd-
out estimates ranging from 16 to 80% that appear to be insensitive to 
the treatment of the overlap group. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are calculated from the difference-in-difference estimates using 
the delta method. Relative to all of the other income groups combined, 
the rate of crowd-out was between 54 to 60% which is consistent with 
the crowd-out estimates in the children’s Medicaid expansions (Gruber 
and Simon, 2008).  The 95% confidence intervals for these estimates 
allow us to rule out a crowd-out rate below 29% and above 85%. 
OLS estimates are consistent with the range of crowd-out levels 
implied by the Diff-in- Diff tabulation estimates though slightly smaller. 
Crowd-out measures from OLS estimates are between 49 to 53% (see 
results in Table 6). Though the tabulation and OLS estimates provide 
us with a general idea of changes in coverage and crowd-out, they are 
likely to be biased and we proceed accordingly with an instrumental 
variables analysis. 
5.2 Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates 
Table 7 presents 2SLS estimates that correspond to Equation 1. 
The key covariate in these models is the variable, Eligible, the 
indicator variable for whether an individual is imputed to be eligible for 
Medicaid, is the dependent variable in these regressions. We 
instrument for this with the simulated eligibility variable and the first-
stage estimates are reported in column (1). All models include state, 
year, and SIPP panel-wave fixed effects, age, age squared, female 
sex, black race, Hispanic origin, marital status, less than high school 
education, high school diploma, a cubic in income, and a state-year 
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linear trend as additional controls.17 Standard errors allow for arbitrary 
correlation in errors within a state. It is no surprise that simulated 
eligibility and imputed eligibility are positively correlated. Indeed, first-
stage estimates in column (1) suggest a large positive effect on the 
likelihood of being Medicaid eligible with more generous Medicaid 
programs (as measured by the simulated instrument). First-stage 
estimates indicate that for a 10 percentage point increase in simulated 
eligibility, there will be a 7.32 percentage point increase in actual 
eligibility. The coefficient on the instrument is statistically significant at 
the 1% level and the F-statistic for the null of the coefficient on the 
instrument is 24. 
The final four columns of Table 7 presents 2SLS estimates from 
the SIPP for various forms of insurance coverage using simulated 
Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for Medicaid eligibility. We 
consider the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the same forms of 
coverage as in the tabulation analysis and also on whether an 
individual is uninsured.18 The effects on Medicaid only, private only, 
and overlap coverage do not need to sum to the effect on the 
uninsured due to potential joint coverage under Medicare or military 
insurance. We explore these possibilities in a robustness check later in 
the paper. 
The key variable of interest is Eligible, which measures the effects 
of Medicaid eligibility on the four forms of coverage. Column (2) of 
Table 7 presents the results for Medicaid only participation. Results 
suggest a 41% take-up rate for Medicaid after the eligibility 
expansions. This means that for every 100 individuals made eligible 
through the expansion, 41 chose to take up Medicaid coverage. In 
conjunction with this increase in Medicaid coverage, there is a roughly 
equivalent decrease in private coverage. Estimates suggest that 45 
individuals lose private coverage for every one hundred who become 
eligible for Medicaid. Coverage for the overlap group increases by 0.15 
percentage points for every ten percentage point increase in Medicaid 
eligibility but is statistically insignificant. Including the effects from the 
                                                          
17 SIPP panel-wave fixed effects were included in the regressions to account for differences in 
interview structures. Excluding these fixed effects does not greatly affect the results. 
 
18 We define a respondent to be uninsured if she reports no coverage from Medicaid, private, 
military, or Medicare insurance. 
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overlap group implies a Medicaid take-up rate of 42% and a private 
coverage reduction rate of 46.5%. The rate of uninsurance increases 
by 1.11 percentage points for every ten percentage point increase in 
Medicaid eligibility though this result is not statistically significant. 
Table 8 presents the crowd-out estimates implied by the take-up 
rates in Table 7. For the purposes of this paper, we define crowd-out 
to be the change in private insurance coverage relative to the change 
in Medicaid coverage.19 The results in the No Overlap column (1) 
ignores any effects from the overlap group while the Overlap column 
(2) accounts for the overlap group by assuming its effect represents a 
transition from private insurance to Medicaid. Crowd-out measures 
appear to be insensitive to the treatment of the overlap group. The 
SIPP estimates suggest complete crowd-out between 110 to 111%. 
Measures of crowd-out are statistically significant at the 5% level for 
both the overlap and no overlap groups using bootstrapped confidence 
intervals.20 The confidence intervals allow us to reject the hypothesis 
that crowd-out was equal to zero at a 5% level in the SIPP and also 
allow us to reject crowd-out rates lower than 26% and higher than 
390%. Given that the 95% confidence intervals suggest a broad range 
of crowd-out estimates, we need to interpret the crowd-out point 
estimate with caution. The intervals do suggest, however, that crowd-
out for the disabled was substantial. In a later robustness check, I 
derive a similarly large point estimate of crowd-out using an 
alternative sample from the March CPS. Since the estimates across the 
two samples are similar, this is suggestive that crowd-out in the 
disabled population was near 100%. 
The crowd-out measure and take-up rates for the disabled 
population in the 2SLS analysis are much larger than what has been 
previously found for other populations such as children and their 
                                                          
19 Some crowd-out literature defines an alternative measure of crowd-out to be the percent 
change in Medicaid that is not associated with a reduction in the uninsurance rate. Since the 
analysis always finds an increase in the uninsurance rate, the alternative measure always 
suggests a crowd-out rate of over 100%. 
 
20 Following the methods of Gruber and Simon (2008) we construct confidence intervals for the 
crowd-out measures using a clustered bootstrap with 350 replications. For each of the 350 
replications we construct crowd-out measures accounting for and not accounting for the overlap 
group.  We then take the 5th and 95th percentile of the constructed crowd-out measures to 
create the confidence intervals. 
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parents. There are several reasons this might be the case. First, the 
disabled are more likely to experience larger total healthcare expenses 
than children due to their chronic medical conditions requiring 
continuing treatment. Given this, private insurance plans for the 
disabled may have larger premiums, coinsurance, or deductibles 
making Medicaid insurance plans (which are free) a more attractive 
option.21 
Second, disabled individuals may use the Medicaid expansions as a 
method of pursuing Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Since 
most private health insurance is provided through an employer, the 
two year waiting period for Medicare coverage might discourage 
disabled individuals from securing SSDI coverage due to the “job lock” 
phenomenon. With the possibility of Medicaid coverage now available 
to them during the waiting period, individuals may have more 
incentive to leave their jobs (which often provide income above SSDI 
qualification levels) and take-up SSDI. If the majority of Medicaid 
take-up originates from individuals pursuing SSDI, then after the two 
year waiting period, costs to the Medicaid program will decrease as 
these individuals qualify for coverage through Medicare. Costs to SSDI 
will increase, however, as they have to provide Medicare for more 
participants. We leave detailed analysis of any increases in SSDI 
participation to future work. 
5.3 Robustness 
The basic results in Table 7 are robust to several alternative 
samples. We find similar effects of Medicaid expansions on public and 
private insurance coverage using the 1997 through 2008 March CPS 
from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The CPS is 
an annual, nationally representative survey that contains information 
on income, family structure, and health insurance status for the year 
prior to the interview. Similar to the SIPP analysis, the CPS sample is 
                                                          
21 It is puzzling that all disabled individuals in the sample would choose to remain uninsured 
rather than accept Medicaid coverage. About sixteen percent of the disabled sample is uninsured 
which is not incredibly different from the insurance rate of the overall population during this 
time period. One possible explanation is that individuals with disabilities are more strongly 
influenced by social stigma than other types of individuals. Another explanation could be that 
disabled individuals lack the knowledge or ability to pursue the Medicaid application which is 
often a lengthy and complicated process. 
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restricted to contain individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who 
report having a work disability. We also drop all observations from the 
five states which are not uniquely identified within the SIPP. Thus, the 
SIPP and March CPS samples should represent similar populations. We 
impute Medicaid eligibility as we did in the SIPP analysis but adjust for 
annual Medicaid income limits and disregards to account for the yearly 
observations of the CPS. Simulated eligibility is constructed similarly 
except it is now at a state and year level. 
Panel A of Table 9 reports two-stage-least-squares health 
insurance coverage estimates using the sample from the March CPS. 
The models in Table 9, Panel A have the same controls on the right 
side of the equation as in the SIPP analysis except they do not control 
for panel-wave fixed effects, which are specific to the survey structure 
of the SIPP. The health coverage variables (Medicaid only, Private 
only, Overlap, and Uninsurance) are defined the same as in the SIPP 
analysis.22 All estimates in Table 9, Panel A are weighted using the 
State Health Access Data Assistance Center’s (SHADAC) summary 
health insurance weight in the March CPS. 
Results in Table 9, Panel A for the CPS analysis suggest a Medicaid 
take-up rate of 25% accompanied by a private reduction rate of 22%. 
These rates are lower in magnitude than what was found in the SIPP 
analysis but may be partially explained by the longer recall period of 
the CPS. The Medicaid take-up rate and private reduction rates 
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9, Panel A only account for 
changes in individuals reporting a single form of coverage for an entire 
year. The yearly observations in the CPS do not identify transitions in 
coverage as well as the monthly level data of the SIPP. As a result, 
individuals who experience transitions from one type of insurance to 
another are much more likely to appear in the overlap group in the 
CPS than in the SIPP. The increased likelihood of overlapping coverage 
potentially results in lower take-up rates for those reporting a single 
                                                          
22 Health coverage variables for the CPS analysis are constructed using the health insurance 
summary variables produced by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center (SHADAC) 
contained within the IPUMS version of the CPS. The CPS updated their survey questionnaire in 
1999 with a verification question to address the underreporting of health insurance.  The 
verification question asked those who had not reported health coverage earlier in the survey 
about their health coverage again and allowed respondents a second chance to report forms of 
health coverage. SHADAC then imputed health insurance variables in the CPS prior to 1999 to 
account for the verification question. 
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form of coverage, but larger take-up rates for those reporting two 
forms of coverage (i.e. private and Medicaid) in the CPS data. Indeed, 
the CPS estimate of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on overlap 
coverage is larger than the SIPP. If we account for this effect by 
interpreting it as a transition from private coverage to Medicaid, then 
the CPS estimates are closer to the level of the SIPP estimates but are 
still slightly lower in magnitude. This is consistent with Ham and 
Shore-Sheppard (2005) which found that take-up rates were more 
similar across the CPS and SIPP when SIPP responses were annualized 
to be more like CPS data. When we account for the overlap group, the 
CPS estimates suggest a crowd- out rate of 90% which is reasonably 
close to the SIPP estimates of crowd-out. A 95% bootstrapped 
confidence interval, however, does not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis for CPS estimates. The effect on uninsurance in column (5) 
of Table 9 Panel A is larger and statistically significant in the CPS 
suggesting a 1.31 percentage point increase for a 10 percentage point 
increase in Medicaid eligibility. There is no clear explanation as to why 
the uninsurance rate appears to be worsening in both samples. This is 
a focus of future work. 
In order to qualify for Medicaid under the OBRA86 expansion, an 
individual must not only have a low level of income they must also be 
disabled. Though the definition of a self- reported work-limiting 
disability in the SIPP is probably less stringent than what is used by 
the government to determine disability status, it does identify a group 
of people likely to qualify for disability services. Since work disabilities 
in the SIPP are self-reported, we may be concerned that the Medicaid 
expansions increased the incentive to report a disability and resulted in 
a compositional shift of the sample across the time period. I find no 
evidence of an effect of eligibility on the likelihood of being work-
disabled (results not shown) suggesting that becoming eligible for 
Medicaid did not induce a person to report a work disability.23 
As a robustness test, we perform the same analysis as in Table 7 
using non-work disabled individuals in the 1996, 2001, and 2004 
                                                          
23 To test this, I run a 2SLS regression of an indicator for a reported work-related disability on an 
indicator for whether a respondent would be financially eligible for Medicaid using the same 
controls in my main analysis. The estimated effect of Medicaid financial eligibility on the 
likelihood of reporting disability status is -0.022 with a standard error of 0.065. 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
21 
 
panels of the SIPP. The results for this analysis are presented in Table 
9, Panel B. There is no significant Medicaid take-up by non-work 
disabled individuals who would qualify for Medicaid based on their 
income alone (see column (2), Table 9, Panel B). In fact, the sign on 
the coefficient suggests there was a slight reduction in Medicaid 
participation for working age non-work disabled individuals though this 
result is not statistically significant. Medicaid eligibility also has small 
statistically insignificant effects on the other forms of coverage (Private 
only, Overlap, and Uninsured) for the non-work disabled. This supports 
the specification being properly identified. 
One concern with the panel nature of the SIPP is the possibility of 
attrition bias. The response rates at the initial interview of each SIPP 
panel are higher than later interviews. We may be concerned that a 
select group of people choose not to respond or enter the dataset in 
later interviews and this influences the overall results. To account for 
this problem, we construct a baseline sample by keeping only 
observations from the first three waves of each panel and respondents 
who were present for the original interview (i.e. all entrants after the 
first wave of the panel are excluded). Table 9, Panel C displays the 
results from this restricted sample. Overall, the point estimates for 
private only coverage and Medicaid remain virtually unaffected though 
the estimates are less precise given the decrease in sample size and 
the effect on private insurance coverage loses statistical significance. 
The attrition sample also only contains observations from 3 years of 
data from my 12 year study period which does not allow us to take full 
advantage of the Medicaid eligibility expansions that vary by year. 
Despite their lack of statistical significance and poor precision, the 
point estimates of the effects on insurance coverage in the attrition 
analysis remain considerably close to the estimates of my main 
specification. This demonstrates that the results of the study are not 
being driven by attriters or entrants in the SIPP panels. 
Another potential concern with the disabled population is its 
increased likelihood of being covered through Medicare. In earlier 
crowd-out studies for children, Medicare coverage was ignored given 
children’s low tendency to be covered through this program. Crowd-
out literature has focused on the treatment of the overlap population 
for private and Medicaid coverage. We might also be concerned with 
the overlap population considering Medicare coverage. That is, we 
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might want to account for individuals who report Medicaid and 
Medicare coverage or private and Medicare coverage in addition to 
private and Medicaid coverage.24 The interpretation for Medicare 
overlap groups will be different from the Medicaid-private overlap 
group. Given that Medicaid is a fully comprehensive plan, there is no 
need for Medicaid recipients to possess private coverage while covered 
by Medicaid. This is the basis for the original overlap assumption of a 
transition from private to public coverage. Medicare, though generous, 
is not completely comprehensive, however, and individuals often hold 
either supplementary private or Medicaid coverage to fill the gaps.25 
Table 10 presents the results accounting for these additional 
Medicare overlap groups. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 present the 
results for private only (now no Medicaid or Medicare) and Medicaid 
only (now no private or Medicare) coverage. The results in column (2) 
of Table 10 suggests the increase in Medicaid coverage with no private 
or Medicare coverage is 2.39 percentage points for every 10 
percentage point increase in eligibility. This is roughly equivalent to 
the decrease in private coverage with no Medicaid or Medicare 
coverage. Considering only these two groups, crowd-out remains large 
and consistent with the earlier specification (115%). Turning to the 
Medicare overlap groups, there is a 1.78 percentage point decrease in 
Private-Medicare coverage for every 10 percentage point increase in 
Medicaid eligibility. This is slightly larger in magnitude than the 
increase in Medicaid-Medicare coverage which increases by 1.67 
percentage points for a 10 percentage point increase in Medicaid 
eligibility. If we consider only these two coverage forms, the estimates 
imply a crowd-out rate of 107%. Bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
crowd-out rates with and without Medicare coverage are wide and do 
not allow us to rule out zero crowd-out. Given the similarity in the 
magnitudes of the opposite signed coefficients of Medicaid only and 
private only and likewise Medicaid-Medicare and private-Medicare, 
however, the results suggest that individuals are choosing to take-up 
                                                          
24 Very few individuals report all three forms of coverage in the same month in the SIPP. 
 
25 For Medicare eligible individuals, Medicare will always cover first-order expenses and Medicaid 
will cover any remaining charges. 
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Medicaid coverage over private coverage either as an individual policy 
or as a supplementary plan for Medicare.26 
6. Conclusion 
     Despite the large cost and important Medicaid eligibility changes 
affecting the working age disabled population, little literature has 
examined the effects of Medicaid eligibility on insurance coverage for 
this group. In this paper, I fill this void by investigating a Medicaid 
eligibility expansion which allowed states the option to enroll disabled 
individuals with incomes up to 100% of the federal poverty level in 
Medicaid. Estimates of crowd-out range from 50 to 100% (OLS and 
2SLS specifications, respectively). The 2SLS estimates suggest that all 
new Medicaid enrollees through the expansions dropped a private plan 
in favor of public coverage. The confidence interval around the 2SLS 
point estimate is wide, however, and should be interpreted cautiously, 
I find a similarly large point estimate of crowd-out using an alternative 
sample derived from the March CPS further supporting that crowd-out 
among the disabled population was substantial. Using population and 
disability rate information from 2008 (the year after the end of my 
study period), I estimate that these expansions cost at most between 
2.92 to 3.03 billion dollars.27 We rely on the average cost of a disabled 
Medicaid recipient to construct these estimates, but it is likely that the 
newly eligible are not as expensive at the margin as the average 
disabled Medicaid recipient. Thus, we should think of 3 billion dollars 
as an upper bound of the cost of the expansions. 
    The analysis of these expansions is especially relevant given the 
enactment of the Medicaid expansions under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act in 2014. For states who accept the current terms 
of the PPACA, Medicaid eligibility levels will increase to include 
individuals under the age of 65 who have incomes less than 138% of 
                                                          
26 If we interpret the overlap group between all three types of coverage as a transition to 
Medicaid Medicare- supplementary plans from Private Medicare-Supplementary plans, then 
crowd-out measures remain similar (130%). 
 
27 In 2008, approximately 15,000,000 individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 reported having 
a working limiting disability. Eligibility increased by roughly 3 percentage points at the peak of 
the expansions implying that close to 450,000 disabled people became eligible for Medicaid 
coverage. Using the estimated take-up rates (between 41 and 42%) and an average cost per 
disabled beneficiary of $15,840 (in FY 2008) this suggests that the expansions cost 
450,000*0.41*15,840=$2.92 billion. 
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the Federal Poverty Level. In 2008, the average income eligibility level 
for the disabled was 87% of the Federal Poverty Level across all 
states. Given the expansions imposed by the PPACA, we can expect 
more disabled individuals to become eligible for Medicaid in 2014. 
Disabled individuals qualifying through the overall Medicaid expansions 
of the PPACA are likely healthier on the margin than individuals 
qualifying through SSI. Given this, my estimates of total costs 
represent an upper bound, but are still informative as to the potential 
costs of the Medicaid expansion. 
    It is important to note that though I find the potential for fiscal 
consequences from these expansions, the results say nothing about 
any potential health benefits gained through the increased Medicaid 
take-up. Even though individuals are less reliant on private health 
insurance, they may experience benefits to health from receiving 
public coverage. First, private health insurance plans may not cover all 
services while Medicaid coverage provides for most procedures 
suggesting that individuals could gain access to medical techniques 
previously unavailable to them and improve overall physical health. 
Second, since Medicaid is a low cost (if not free) policy with virtually 
no copays or deductibles, individuals may benefit from having 
additional resources available for consumption. For many of these 
individuals, coverage through the Medicaid program will greatly lessen 
financial strain and can have an effect on mental health or overall 
happiness (Finkelstein et. al., 2012). Another potential benefit of 
disabled Medicaid coverage is that sicker individuals will leave 
employer group plans and result in smaller or slower growing 
insurance premiums for the privately insured individuals who remain 
on the plan. 
    There are some potential health detriments to Medicaid coverage, 
however. Due to low reimbursement rates, not all physicians will 
accept Medicaid coverage and beneficiaries are restricted to a limited 
group of health providers and may experience access problems. For 
adults with public health insurance, healthcare access is slightly worse 
than patients with private insurance (Government Accounting Office, 
2012). There is also some evidence that the quality of care is worse 
for patients with public insurance compared with private insurance, but 
this difference is small (Weissman et al., 2013). Given these potential 
health benefits and detriments it is important to examine health 
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outcomes in conjunction with the fiscal consequences. We leave the 
analysis of health outcomes to future work. 
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Table 1. Medicaid upper income thresholds for the disabled population: 1996 and 
2007. 
 
Bold and italicized states are those using the 209(b) option. 
* Arizona offers Medicaid eligibility for those at or below 100% FPL through the 
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System. This system was formed through a 
special demonstration waiver (Section 1115). Massachusetts extends Medicaid 
eligibility even further to 133% FPL using a Section 1115 demonstration as well. 
** Hawaii and Alaska have higher federal poverty levels than the continental United 
States. The upper income limits for these two states are constructed relative to the 
poverty level of the 48 remaining states. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for SIPP Individuals Reporting a Work Disability by 
Eligibility Status. 
 
Summary statistics are weighted using the individual weight in the 1996, 2001, and 
2004 SIPP panels. I can reject the null at a P-value of 0.01 that the sample means are 
the same across samples for all variables. 9293 individuals were in both the ineligible 
and eligible samples over the time period resulting in a total of 41,554 individuals 
included throughout the entire analysis. 
Table 3: Pre and Post Trends in State Insurance Coverage Rates Work Disabled 
Sample 1992-2008 March CPS 
 
Notes: Results are from the 1992–2008 March CPS. Regressions are OLS regressions 
of four types of state insurance coverage rates (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both 
Medicaid and Private, and Uninsured) on a pre-adoption trend and a post-adoption 
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trend. All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. * Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% 
significance level. *** Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted 
using the SHADAC constructed weight for CPS health insurance coverage. 
Table 4: Changes in Health Insurance Coverage, 1996 to 2007, by Income Group 
Work Disability Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels 
 
 
    Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. 
Income groups are based on countable income as a percent of the federal poverty 
level. Sample sizes are 12,888 in <=74% FPL group, 2467 in 74–100% FPL group, 
3400 in 100–150% FPL group, 5533 in 150% + FPL group. Overlap represents 
respondents who report having both private and Medicaid coverage. Medicaid 
represents respondents reporting Medicaid and no private coverage. Private represents 
respondents reporting private and no Medicaid coverage. Results are weighted using 
the individual weight from the SIPP. * Represents a 10% significance level. ** 
Represents a 5% significance level. *** Represents a 1% significance level.           
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 5: Crowd-out from Difference-in-Difference Analysis Work Disability Sample 
from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels 
  
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are constructed from Table 4 estimates 
using the delta method. The table contains crowd-out measures using difference-in-
difference estimates in Table 4. The “No Overlap” column does not account for the 
population reporting both private and Medicaid insurance coverage. The “Overlap” 
column accounts for this population assuming that the change in overlap coverage 
represents a transition from private to public coverage. Income groups represent 
monthly income of the individual minus Medicaid disregards as a percent of the federal 
poverty level. * Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance 
level. *** Represents a 1% significance level.                                                                
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table 6: OLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage Regressions, Work Disability 
Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels 
 
 
Notes: Results are from the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the SIPP. Regressions are 
OLS regressions of four forms of health coverage (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both 
Medicaid and Private, and Uninsured) on imputed Medicaid eligibility. All models 
included 170,909 observations and control for panel-wave, state and year fixed 
effects, a state-linear trend, age, age squared, a cubic in income, number of children 
in household, and family size. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * 
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. *** 
Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SIPP 
provided person-level weight.                                                                                       
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Table 7: First-Stage Estimates for and 2SLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage 
Regressions, Work Disability Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * 
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. *** 
Represents a 1% significance level. All models have 170,909 observations. All 
regressions are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight. All regressions 
control for panel-wave, state and year fixed effects, a state linear trend, age, age 
squared, a cubic in income, number of children in household, and family size.                                                                                    
Source: Author's Calculation. 
Table 8: The Extent of Crowd-out from Work Disability Population from 1996, 
2001, 2004 panels of the SIPP 
 
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals and these values are 
constructed using a clustered bootstrap with 350 repetitions. The No Overlap column 
estimates the extent of crowd-out without considering the population with overlapping 
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coverage. The Overlap column includes the overlapping coverage population in its 
calculation assuming that the change in overlap coverage represents a transition from 
private to public coverage. 
Table 9: First-Stage for and 2SLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage Regressions 
Robustness of Results to Alternative Samples 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * 
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. *** 
Represents a 1% significance level. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions of four forms 
of health coverage (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both Medicaid and Private, and 
Uninsured) for different sample populations using simulated eligibility as an 
instrument. All columns control for state and year fixed effects, age, age squared, 
number of children in household, family size, female sex, black race, Hispanic origin, 
marital status, cubic in personal income, less than high school education, and high 
school diploma.                                                                                                          
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Panel A: Results for this table are for the 1997–2008 March CPS surveys. Sample 
includes all individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who report a work disability. 
The 5 states that are not uniquely identified in the SIPP are excluded from the CPS 
analysis. Results are weighted using the SHADAC constructed weight for CPS health 
insurance coverage.                                                                                               
Panel B: Sample includes individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 in the 1996, 
2001, and 2004 panels of the SIPP who do not report a work disability. All regressions 
are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight.                                                                               
Panel C: Sample includes individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who report a 
work disability in the in all 3 of the first three waves of each SIPP panel. All 
regressions are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight.                                                                             
Source: Author's calculation. 
 
Table 10: Effects of Medicaid Eligibility on Insurance Coverage for Work-Disabled 
Individuals in the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels: Adjusting Insurance Coverage 
Measures to Account for Medicare (170,909 observations) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. * 
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. *** 
Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SIPP 
provided person-level weight. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions of various forms of 
health coverage on Medicaid income eligibility using simulated eligibility as an 
instrument. Coverage forms are defined similar as in earlier tables, but now take into 
account Medicare coverage. Three represents coverage by all three forms of insurance 
(Medicaid, Private, and Medicare). All columns control for panel-wave, state and year 
fixed effects, a state-linear trend, age, age squared, a cubic in income, number of 
children in household, family size, female sex, black race, Hispanic origin, marital 
status, less than high school education, and high school diploma.                                                                                                  
Source: Author's calculation. 
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Appendix: Pathways for Disabled Medicaid Eligibility 
A.1 Categorical Eligibility – SSI Recipients 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program is run by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) and provides a cash supplement to the aged 
and disabled who have few financial resources. Individuals are eligible to 
receive SSI if their countable income and assets are less than the income and 
resource eligibility levels determined by the SSA.28 In 2012, the SSI income 
and resource eligibility levels for an individual were 75% of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) and $2,000 respectively (Social Security Administration, 
2012). 
States are required to offer Medicaid to all SSI recipients unless they 
use a 209(b) option that allows states to employ stricter eligibility levels than 
SSI requirements. However, under this option, the eligibility levels cannot be 
any more restrictive than Medicaid eligibility levels used by the state in 1972 
– when SSI was created. Eleven states used the 209(b) option in 2009.29 
Each 209(b) state has at least one aspect of Medicaid eligibility that is more 
restrictive than federal SSI standards. The most obvious method of imposing 
stricter standards is through lower income and resource eligibility levels 
though some states choose stricter definitions of disability or countable 
income/assets. Standards for SSI have changed little over the time period 
considered in this paper. SSI/categorical eligibility is the only mandatory 
Medicaid pathway for the aged and disabled that all states must offer. All 
other pathways are at the option of the state. 
A.2 State Supplemental Payments (SSP) 
States may choose to offer supplementary payments to SSI recipients 
and also to those who do not qualify for SSI but have lower levels of income. 
The state supplemental payment option allows states to increase their cash 
assistance levels for the elderly and disabled above the federal standard. 
States choose the size of their supplemental payments effectively creating an 
income “floor” for eligible state residents. States have complete control over 
                                                          
28 Countable income is the applicant’s total income minus certain monetary disregards. There is a 
federally mandated disregard of $20 dollars though some states are more generous. In addition, 
$65 of earned income plus half of remaining earnings are disregarded when constructing 
countable income. See the SSA’s “Understanding Supplemental Security Income” website at 
http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-understanding-ssi.htm for more information. 29 These states were 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, and Virginia. 
 
29 These states were Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia.   
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SSP eligibility levels and can vary them by living arrangement, type of 
recipient (aged or disabled), and by regional differences (typically differences 
in the cost of living) within a state (Stone, 2002). Throughout my analysis, I 
use SSP levels for an individual living independently since the data only 
contain information for non-institutionalized individuals. The income eligibility 
level for the SSP pathway is roughly equal to the maximum allowance offered 
through SSI plus the additional SSP payments. All states, however, must use 
the SSI resource levels unless they are a 209(b) state.30 
Individuals who receive SSP from the state but do not qualify for SSI 
are referred to as SSP-only recipients and are not eligible for Medicaid 
through the SSI pathway.31 States have the option to extend Medicaid 
coverage to SSP-only individuals and most states offering SSP pursue this 
option. In 2001, twenty-five states offered SSP-only Medicaid coverage to the 
qualifying individuals living independently (Bruen, 2003). Most states offer a 
supplement that raises an individual’s income and subsequent Medicaid 
eligibility level just above SSI levels. Some states, however, offer large 
payments that can effectively raise the SSP-only Medicaid income eligibility 
level above the federal poverty level (Bruen, 2003).32 SSP policies have also 
varied little over the time period considered in this paper. 
A.3 Medically Needy 
A medically needy program allows individuals with high income but 
large amounts of medical expenses to qualify for Medicaid coverage. States 
with medically needy programs allow residents to subtract their medical 
expenses from their countable income and essentially “spend- down” to 
Medicaid eligibility. That is, for states with medically needy programs there is 
effectively no income limit on Medicaid applicants as long as an applicant 
incurs enough medical costs to reach the medically needy income limit. 
209(b) states who do not have a medically needy program must allow 
individuals to spend down to eligibility. Though states may choose to offer 
less generous benefits packages to medically needy individuals, medically 
needy packages are essentially the same as those offered for income eligible 
recipients. 
States can choose medically needy income and resource levels unique 
from other pathways for eligibility. Most states choose to set their medically 
                                                          
30 In which case they use the resource level used by the 209(b) state. 
 
31 SSP-only individuals are those who have incomes higher than SSI levels, but lower than the 
income floor set by the state. 
 
32 States with the maximum SSI/SSP for the independently living aged and disabled above 100% 
of the FPL in 2001 were Connecticut and Alaska. 
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needy levels well below poverty and sometimes even below SSI standards. To 
qualify under the medically needy pathway, applicants get a certain time 
period (1 to 6 months depending on the state) to reduce their income by their 
medical expenses. If they reach the medically needy income limit after the 
deduction of their medical expenses then they qualify for Medicaid coverage 
for the rest of the period. Except for four states (Texas and South Carolina 
eliminated their medically needy programs in 1996 and 1993 respectively. 
Oklahoma and Oregon both ended their medically needy programs in 2003), 
all states that had a medically needy program in 1991 also had them in 2008. 
In 2008, 33 states had a medically needy program. 
A.4 Medicaid Buy-in for the Working Disabled 
Though Medicaid does disregard certain amounts of earned income 
when determining eligibility, many working disabled have too much income to 
qualify for Medicaid coverage. This pathway allows disabled individuals to 
work and earn up to 250% of the federal poverty level. Unlike other Medicaid 
recipients, however, workers qualifying under this pathway have to pay a 
premium and buy-in to the Medicaid program. Premiums for the Medicaid 
buy-in tend to be much smaller than those available on the private market. 
A.5 Medicare Cost Sharing – Dual Eligibles: QMB’s, SLMB’s, and QI’s 
Medicaid always acts as the payer of last resort allowing all other 
sources of payment to be exhausted before coverage. Disabled individuals 
who have been covered under Social Security Disability Insurance for 24 
months qualify for coverage by Medicare. Medicare, however, is not a full 
coverage health insurance plan though its coverage is quite extensive.  There 
are gaps within Medicare benefits (such as long-term care expenses and 
prescription drug costs) and it also requires premiums and copays that many 
low income individuals may not be able to afford. 
To prevent Medicare eligible individuals from dropping their Medicare 
policies in favor of less expensive Medicaid coverage, Medicaid began offering 
coverage of Medicare premiums and copayments for individuals who qualify 
for both Medicare and Medicaid (dual-eligibles). For dual-eligibles, Medicaid 
will only cover what Medicare does not, allowing Medicare to cover many of 
the first order expenses. 
There are three forms of dual-eligibles that qualify for different 
provisions through Medicaid. A Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) was 
established under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. QMB’s 
receive Medicaid coverage of Medicare Part B premiums, deductibles, and 
copayments if they qualify for Medicare Part A and have incomes less than 
100% of the Federal Poverty Level. Specified Low-Income Medicare 
Beneficiaries (SLMB’s) were established in 1993 and qualify for Medicare Part 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
43 
 
B premiums if they qualify for Medicare Part A and have incomes above 100% 
but less than 110% of the federal poverty level. The SLMB income limit was 
raised in 1995 to 120% of the FPL. The last of the dual-eligible types is a 
Qualifying Individual-1 (QI-1) who has incomes above 120% but below 135% 
of the federal poverty level. Medicaid will pay the Part B premiums for QI-1’s. 
All Medicare cost sharing participants must have resources less than twice SSI 
levels. 
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